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The Environmental (Un)sustainability of the Base-of-the-Pyramid (BOP) 
Philosophy: A Governance Perspective 
 
The Base- or Bottom-of-the-Pyramid (BOP) philosophy has rapidly gained currency in 
business, following seminal articles and books in the popular management literature (Prahalad 
and Hammond, 2002; Hart and Christensen, 2002; Prahalad, 2005; Hart, 2005). The thrust of 
the BOP philosophy is to achieve economic and social development to four billion persons 
with very low incomes through a practical business model that proposes decentralized, often 
small-scale production and consumption activities that are tailored to the needs of the poor. 
The BOP philosophy has appealed to many in the business (education) world (World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development, 2007; Aspen Institute, 2007; Economist, 2004). By 
contrast, the academic research community has clearly lagged behind. The rare publications in 
scholarly journals have focused on the economic and social dimensions of the BOP 
philosophy (Kandachar and Halme, 2007). While its viability and merits have been 
questioned (Karnani, 2007a, b; Landrum, 2007), the continued exploration of the socio-
economic potential of the BOP business model, with a number of demonstrated „success 
stories‟ (Prahalad, 2005; Center for Sustainable Global Enterprise, 2007), is definitely 
worthwhile – especially against the backdrop of the lack of success of alternative models 
(Sachs, 2005; Stiglitz, 2006). 
Curiously, the academic debate has largely ignored the environmental dimension of the 
BOP phenomenon. Allusion has been made to the environmental opportunities and threats 
(Hart, 2005; Prahalad, 2005), but a systematic conceptual analysis of the environmental 
repercussions of widespread BOP-driven development has so far lacked in the academic 
literature (Kandachar and Halme, 2007). This is, however, a pertinent question since massive 
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BOP-framed economic activities would constitute a formidable challenge to the Earth‟s 
capacity to provide sufficient natural resources and absorb polluting substances. The objective 
of this essay is to fill this void by providing a theoretical argument of the compatibility of the 
BOP philosophy and environmental sustainability, with the latter referring to enabling long-
term socio-economic development within the boundaries of the Earth‟s carrying capacity 
(World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987; Daly, 1990). In particular, I 
focus on the different governance options that have the potential to mediate the relation 
between economic development and environmental performance in the BOP context. 
Adopting a „realist‟ – rather than a normative – perspective, my guiding question is whether 
different environmental governance instruments are likely to mediate massive BOP-driven 
economic development in such a way that it will be environmentally sustainable. 
The essay is structured as follows. I start with an analysis of major environmental 
effects of economic activities (extraction of natural resources and pollution), tailored to the 
idiosyncracies of the BOP context (development problems, size, and economic geography). 
Next I discuss the possible instruments to govern the environmental challenges that ensue 
from BOP-driven development, split into market-driven mechanisms (market clearing, 
corporate innovation, and corporate social responsibility or CSR) and non-market options 
(government regulation, industry self-regulation, and civic action). I will finally summarize 
the main outcomes and draw some conclusions as to the environmental (un)sustainability of 
the BOP philosophy. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES IN THE BOP CONTEXT 
The environmental consequences of economic development in general, and the BOP 
context in particular, will be analyzed in the first part of this section. The second part will 
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address the environmental impact of two key characteristics of BOP markets: small scale and 
geographic dispersion. 
 
Environmental Effects of Economic Activities in the BOP Context 
The impact of economic activities on the natural environment encompasses a lot of 
aspects, including global climate change, more local pollution (of air, water, and land), 
biodiversity, the exploitation of depletable natural resources, biodiversity, and space use 
(United Nations Environment Programme, 2007). For reasons of analytical parsimony, and in 
line with Tietenberg (1988) and Meadows, Randers, and Meadows (2005), I confine myself to 
two major environmental dimensions: the extraction of natural resources and (local and 
global) pollution (Tietenberg, 1988). 
Widespread application of the BOP business model is likely to lead to an absolute 
deterioration of the natural environment. Economic activities involve the use of energy, 
minerals, wood, space, etc. Companies and households also pollute the surrounding air, water, 
and land during production and consumption processes. This has led neo-Malthusian 
academics to predict that further economic expansion will lead to a collapse of natural 
ecosystems (Meadows, Meadows, Randers, and Behrens, 1972; Meadows et al., 2005; United 
Nations Environment Programme, 2007). Against the backdrop that 20% of the world 
population consumes about 80% of the world‟s natural resources (United Nations 
Development Programme, 1998), affluence for four billion poor citizens is likely to 
dramatically increase the pressure on the natural environment. The environmental pressure is 
likely to further exacerbate by the expected 2.6 billion person increase in developing countries 
over the next four decades (United Nations, 2005). 
Next to sheer size, the nature of economic activities provides reason for concern. In 
their quest for survival, many BOP consumers focus on basic necessities such as securing 
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food and shelter (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007). Only when these „lower needs‟ – in Maslowian 
terms – have been satisfied, will consumers pursue more „luxury‟ goods such as 
environmental protection (Winsemius and Guntram, 2002). Even if producers and consumers 
in BOP countries were actively searching to satisfy environmental needs, widespread 
ignorance – a corollary of the lack of good (environmental) education – keeps them from 
taking well-informed decisions (Karnani, 2007b; Banerjee and Duflo, 2007). The difficulty to 
effectively govern the natural environment is further enhanced by the large size of the 
informal sector in BOP countries, rendering (environmental) regulation an arduous job (De 
Soto, 2000).  
In sum, BOP-driven economic development within the confines of the Earth‟s carrying 
capacity constitutes a major challenge given the number of actors involved and the nature of 
their economic needs. 
 
Environmental Impact of Size and Geography 
While BOP advocates see a significant role for (cooperation with) large corporations, 
they advance especially small-scale economic activities as a way of accommodating the low 
purchasing power and working capital of poor consumers and entrepreneurs (Prahalad, 2005; 
Hart, 2005). Supplying products in small units (such as single-serve packages of washing 
powder and shared use of mobile phones) renders these products accessible to consumers who 
cannot afford the conventionally supplied products. BOP entrepreneurs, who typically cannot 
access regular financial markets, set up small businesses for which the modest capital 
requirements do not represent a major hurdle. Micro credits are the financial enablers of such 
small-scale consumption and production activities (Yunus, 2007). Smallness of scale is also 
related to the socio-geographic reality of many BOP markets. A large number of prospective 
consumers and producers live in remote rural areas, which brings about logistic difficulties 
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against the backdrop of large distances and an often poorly-developed infrastructure (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2007). Furthermore, BOP actors face divergent atmospheric, geophysical, and 
socio-cultural conditions, making universal products manufactured at a large scale 
inappropriate. Decentralized products and processes tailored to the idiosyncratic needs of 
local actors are, therefore, an important element of the BOP philosophy (Hart, 2005; Prahalad, 
2005). 
Small-scale, decentralized activities involve three aspects with environmental 
consequences: scale (dis)economies, shared use of economic resources, and local orientation. 
Scale economies arise when large size of procurement, production, and marketing leads to 
lower (environmental) costs („static economies‟) and when learning effects progressively 
reduce (environmental) costs („dynamic economies‟). The small scale of BOP activities leads 
to a number of static diseconomies (Karnani, 2007a), including environmental ones. The 
procurement of small quantities of inputs involves a larger number of logistic movements and 
a greater environmental load – more energy consumption, more air pollution – than the same 
overall quantity transported in larger batches. Production diseconomies exist because 
environmental equipment that makes sense for large-scale activities (for example, a large 
hotel purifying its effluent water) may not be affordable or cost-efficient for micro-scale 
activities (such as lodging in private backyards). Diseconomies in the field of marketing 
include inefficient packaging (many small units require more packing material than the same 
overall quantity of products sold in larger packaging), as well as more logistic movements. 
Dynamic diseconomies also exist, because small static scale leads, ceteris paribus, to a 
smaller number of cumulative units purchased, produced, and marketed per BOP (production) 
household and thus – in the absence of active information exchange between households – to 
more restricted learning opportunities for BOP households to improve upon their 
(environmental) performance (Argote, 1999). The scale diseconomies can, to a certain extent, 
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be overcome through bilateral alliances with large (multinational) organizations (Hart, 2005; 
Prahalad, 2005) and multilateral (local) networks of small firms (Rocha, 2004), although the 
transactional barriers to the realization of such collaborative platforms – in terms of partner 
selection and governance – are considerable. 
Sharing economic resources with other small producers or consumers has a relatively 
beneficial environmental effect, because it prevents the multiplication of resources for a given 
level of economic activities (Von Weizsäcker, Lovins, and Lovins, 1997). For example, when 
farmers share a tractor or citizens use a joint cell phone, a smaller number of tractors and cell 
phones (with their concomitant natural-resource use and manufacturing-related pollution) is 
required than for individually owned artefacts, given a particular level of agricultural 
production and phone calls. Since resource sharing reduces the outlay per (financially  
constrained) user, and the joint purchase and exploitation of  a private economic resource is 
relatively easy to organize among geographically and socially close actors (Coleman, 1988), it 
is a feasible option with definite environmental advantages. 
Decentralization has a mixed environmental effect. Local markets that are self-reliant 
preclude the need to transport products over large distances, thus avoiding natural-resource 
depletion and pollution in relation to long-distance transport (Schumacher, 1973). In a 
globalized economy, many products cross the world throughout their value chain (say, a 
garment sold in Germany was manufactured in China on the basis of cotton grown in Mali 
and spun in India). The global nature of these transport activities involves a huge consumption 
of fossil fuels and concomitant (air) pollution. Locally self-reliant economies perform 
environmentally better in this respect. A negative environmental aspect is that the geographic 
dissemination of activities, especially in the field of manufacturing, will lead to the 
multiplication of the number of polluted areas. From an environmental viewpoint, it may be 
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preferable to have economic activities, especially highly polluting ones, concentrated at a few 
controlled places, rather than dispersed over numerous decentralized sites. 
To recap, the environmental performance related to the small scale and decentralization 
of BOP activities is mixed. Shared resource use and the relatively restricted geographic action 
radius have a beneficial effect, while pollution dispersion, more limited environmental 
learning opportunities, as well as scale diseconomies related to a larger number of traffic 
movements, investment thresholds, and resource efficiency lead to poorer performance than 
similar activities at a larger scale. I now consider the prospects of different governance 
mechanisms in effectively mediating the relationships between economic activities and 
environmental performance in the BOP context. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN THE BOP CONTEXT 
A variety of private and public options exist to govern the environment. Since BOP 
advocates highlight the importance of the market, I will start by analyzing market-driven 
governance mechanisms and then consider the feasibility of non-market instruments. 
 
Market-Driven Environmental Solutions 
In this section, I analyze the extent to and ways in which the market will safeguard 
environmental sustainability while spurring economic development. Three possible market 
solutions will be considered: market clearing, corporate innovation, and CSR. 
 
Market clearing. Raw-material use and pollution impact the behaviour of economic 
actors in different ways (Tietenberg, 1988). Both effects involve externalities, since they lead 
to costs or benefits for others than those directly involved in the transaction that engenders the 
externality (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Liebowitz and Margolis, 1994). The nature of these 
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externalities is, though, substantially different. Non-renewable natural resources are inelastic 
in nature, implying that their availability irreversibly falls upon exploitation. While renewable 
resources (such as rice plants) can be replenished after consumption, the decrease of a finite 
stock of non-renewable resources drives up the market price of the remaining resources of the 
same kind. This pecuniary externality induces customers of non-renewable natural resources 
to moderate their demand by using the focal resource more parsimoniously or by substituting 
the resource with alternatives that are less scarce. For example, the soaring oil price has 
recently fuelled the demand for more efficient car engines and has stimulated the installation 
of coal-fired power plants (Economist, 2007).  
In the BOP context, consumers are very price sensitive owing to their low purchasing 
power. Therefore, they will strongly react to higher prices by procuring products that employ 
scarce natural resources to a lesser extent. Rising prices of highly demanded natural resources 
thus provide a market-clearing mechanism that prevents a natural resource from exhaustion 
(Tietenberg, 1988). One important exception are common pool resources: natural resources 
whose property rights are ill-defined or ill-enforceable and who have a „natural‟ tendency to 
be overexploited because suppliers of those resources (such as ocean fish or fresh water) have 
an incentive to extract and market more of the remaining resources before other suppliers who 
can access the same (finite) common pool resources will do so and exhaust the entire stock 
(Kölliker, 2005). In the latter case, there is no market mechanism that prevents suppliers from 
unsustainable natural-resource extraction.  
Residual substances emitted by companies during production or by customers during 
consumption constitute another type of externalities. Pollution is a non-pecuniary externality: 
the reduced well-being due to polluted air, water, and land is not automatically reflected in 
market prices (Tietenberg, 1988). While it may rewarding for producers and consumers to 
employ products and processes that are more efficient than their „dirty‟ counterparts and thus 
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save money while preventing pollution (Hart, 2005), there is no systematic evidence that 
„cleaner‟ practices will indeed pay off (Vogel, 2005). As a result, emitters of polluting 
substances do not have a „natural‟ incentive to amend their behaviour and reduce pollution 
levels. 
One important proviso to the shortfall of the market with respect to pollution abatement 
is that economic actors may show preferences for environmental protection and thus 
voluntarily exert a demand for „cleaner‟ products and processes. The environmental Kuznets 
curve, which is the statistical observation that the pollution levels of countries initially rise but 
then fall when national incomes rise, embodies this idea by suggesting that developing 
countries will „automatically‟ become „cleaner‟ once they reach higher stages of economic 
development (Cole and Neumayer, 2005). The philosophy underlying the environmental 
Kuznets curve is that composition and technique effects prevail over scale effects at higher 
levels of economic development. While countries initially face the dominance of negative 
scale effects of increased production (with concomitantly rising pollution levels), they convert 
the composition of their production from pollution-intensive (especially heavy industry) to 
pollution-extensive (especially light industry and services) when their incomes rise. 
Furthermore, higher income levels provide the financial resources to invest in „cleaner‟ 
production and consumption technologies. Once countries have thus met their basic needs, 
they will increasingly „clean up‟ their economic activities. It may thus be argued that once 
BOP markets prosper, pollution levels will automatically fall. The environmental Kuznets 
curve has, however, been criticized, both on statistical grounds (Stern, Common, and Barbier, 
1996; Ekins, 1997) and on conceptual grounds (Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Suri and 
Chapman, 1998). In particular, the idea of ceasing pollution-intensive activities is a pitfall, 
because the practice of shifting „dirty‟ activities to lower-income countries and importing 
„dirty‟ products back from those countries cannot be sustained if and when low-income 
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countries are to develop themselves to escape from the pollution trap. In other words, to 
where should dirty activities who remain in high demand (such as basic metals, chemicals, 
and paper and pulp) be reallocated if there are no longer prospective low-income countries 
(Cole and Neumayer, 2005)? Recent evidence (United Nations Environment Programme, 
2007) suggests that „dirty‟ productive activities in emerging economies have led to sharply 
increased global pollution levels. 
In sum, the market for many natural resources is self-clearing because rising demand for 
natural resources will lead to higher prices that prevent those resources from exhaustion. By 
contrast, the market falls short when it comes to the extraction of common pool resources and 
the control of air, water, and land pollution. One possible escape route from massive pollution 
looks like a dead end because the practice of shifting dirty activities to low-income countries 
cannot be replicated when those markets start developing themselves.  
 
Corporate innovation. Disruptive innovations are considered corner stones of effective 
BOP development. Prahalad (2005: 30, 33) states that “The BOP market opportunity cannot 
be satisfied by watered-down versions of traditional technology solutions from the developed 
markets. The BOP market can and must be addressed by the most advanced technologies (…) 
Solutions must be sustainable and ecologically friendly” (italics added). In a similar vein, Hart 
(2005: 69-70) argues that “Clean technology refers not to the incremental improvement 
associated with pollution prevention, but to innovations that leapfrog standard routines and 
knowledge. (…) Thus, rather than simply seeking to reduce the negative impacts of their 
operations, firms can strive to solve social and environmental problems through the internal 
development or acquisition of new capabilities that address the sustainability challenge 
directly” (italics added). These quotes illustrate that environmentally benign innovations have 
an important role to play in the BOP philosophy. At the same time, they show that the 
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environment is the BOP‟s soft underbelly because normative and discretionary qualifications 
such as „must‟ and „can‟ are by no means guarantees that BOP actors will actually come up 
with market-driven solutions that do not adversely affect the environment. 
Innovations are the product of the drive and the capacity to come up with new 
combinations of products and processes (Fagerberg, 2005). Innovation is thus contingent on 
the motivation and the cognitive and material ability to realize new products and processes. 
As argued above, incentives for environmentally relevant behaviour differ per type of 
environmental effect. In the BOP context, there is a „natural‟ incentive to come up with 
disruptive innovations that save natural resources, especially scarce ones, because poor people 
will prefer products that are inexpensive in purchasing price and use. Products that take few 
natural resources to be produced and consumed will, therefore, be preferred to alternatives 
that require more (scarce) natural resources. For example, inventive products on the basis of 
recycled raw materials, such as bags and shoes made from worn car tyres, can be readily 
observed on BOP markets. This drive to realize products and processes that are parsimonious 
of precious natural resources will be particularly large in the case of massive BOP 
development since large numbers of BOP actors will exert a demand for similar natural 
resources. The scarcity of energy and minerals as a result of the exponential growth of 
emerging economies such as China and India has already led to major price increases of these 
resources (Economist, 2008). This effect will only be exacerbated when other BOP markets 
will massively follow suit. 
By contrast, the market does not provide „natural‟ incentives to come up with 
innovations that do not pollute. BOP actors are likely to primarily care for their immediate 
basic needs, such as food, shelter, and health. While innovative products and processes do not 
necessarily involve pollution, they will first and foremost be geared towards meeting basic 
needs at a very low price, which is already a major challenge in itself, and not towards the 
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„luxury‟ of a healthy living environment. Furthermore, since pollution is an environmental 
effect that often does more harm to others than to the polluters themselves, BOP market actors 
are unlikely to pursue innovations that are pollution-extensive. For example, many of the 
annual 13 billion single-serve sachets sold that render shampoo and other amenities accessible 
to low-income Indian consumers abound as uncontrolled and uncollected litter after use 
(Prahalad, 2005). 
Next to incentives, the cognitive, technical, and financial capacity of prospective 
innovators is of critical importance. While examples can be provided of new products and 
processes that are environmentally benign (Hart, 2005), it still needs to be demonstrated that 
economic actors are capable of creating products and processes with little adverse 
environmental impact for a full range of basic human needs. Innovations are only feasible to 
the extent that they are materially possible (i.e., they are not at odds with physical laws and 
draw on sufficiently available natural resources) and are within the cognitive reach of human 
actors (i.e., the technical possibilities are realized and correctly understood). Since we are 
largely ignorant about the possible technical and cognitive BOP-related repertoires, it is 
dangerous to indulge in unbridled optimism. While the proposed direction of natural-
resource-poor and pollution-extensive innovations (Hart, 2005) is the right one, we should 
beware not to conflate real but uncaptured innovative opportunities and wishful thinking. In 
the face of immense uncertainty as to the feasibility of environmentally benign innovations, 
promising yet unrealized innovations should not be oversold. An example of past unjustified 
optimism is the „green revolution‟ that never realized its promise to feed the hungry through 
innovative crops and cultivation methods (Drèze and Sen, 1991). Furthermore, the proposed 
environmentally benign innovations in areas such as biotechnology (Hart, 2005) are highly 
capital-intensive, placing them well outside the reach of most BOP entrepreneurs. The 
proposed solution of alliances with large multinational companies (Hart, 2005) may be viable, 
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but adds at least significant governance complexity to the realization of such innovative 
ventures. 
To recap, technological innovations have an important potential role to play, which is 
more likely to materialize for parsimonious natural-resource exploitation than for pollution 
prevention and abatement. The contribution of corporate innovations to effective 
environmental governance should, therefore, be interpreted with caution. 
 
Corporate social responsibility. While Prahalad (2005: 6) stresses that BOP markets 
“cannot merely be relegated to the realm of corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives”, 
there might be good business reasons for companies to engage in CSR. Companies may 
voluntarily reduce their environmental impact to enhance the legitimacy of their societal 
stakeholders and attract customers seeking „green‟ products (Holliday, Schmidheiny, and 
Watts, 2002). The empirical status  of „doing well by doing good‟ is contested: certain studies 
find a positive correlation between socio-environmental initiatives and financial performance, 
while others report inconclusive or mixed evidence (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Vogel 
(2005) and Reich (2007) conclude that there is a weak empirical business case for Western 
companies to reduce their environmental load, except for specific cases where „greening‟ also 
yields other benefits (such as increased health for consumers). In the BOP context, where care 
for the environment may be considered a „luxury‟ against the backdrop of mere survival, the 
business incentives for corporate greening seem to be even weaker.  
A few exceptions should be noted. There may be (niche) markets for „environmentally 
responsible‟ goods and services for relatively affluent, environmentally sensitive (Western) 
customers (Esty and Winston, 2006). Furthermore, (Western) multinational companies that 
want to perform well with respect to CSR – for example, to meet the demands of their home-
country stakeholders – may engage in environmentally benign activities (with local partners) 
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in BOP countries (London and Hart, 2004). The prospects of CSR-inspired greening activities 
thus seem modest, with the exception of activities for and with environmentally sensitive 
affluent actors. 
In conclusion, market-based governance mechanisms provide a weak to high potential 
for effective governance, depending on the nature of the environmental issue. The market 
copes well with natural-resource scarcity (with the exception of common pool resources) but 
falls short when it comes to pollution prevention and abatement. Non-market governance 
solutions to the problems of pollution and the depletion of common pool resources will be 
explored in the next section.  
 
Non-Market Environmental Governance 
Government regulation, industry self-regulation, and civic action are possible 
instruments in the arena of non-market governance. I will now analyze these options at 
different levels: macro (government regulation), meso (self-regulation), and micro (civic 
action).  
 
Government regulation. Government intervention can be an effective remedy to market 
failure in the environmental arena (Tietenberg, 1988). Ill-defined property rights, adverse 
incentives, and pervasive uncertainty are major causes of short-falling markets (Kölliker, 
2005; Tietenberg, 1988). Governments can wield a variety of policy instruments, including 
regulation, subsidies, taxes, and standards (Jordan, Wurzel, and Zito, 2005). These 
instruments can be applied at the local or national level (Peters and Pierre, 2006; Moran, Rein, 
and Goodin, 2006) and the international or supranational level (Wijen, Zoeteman, and Pieters, 
2005; Dauvergne, 2005). Governments of developing countries typically fall short in 
protecting the natural environment (Opschoor, 2005; Sachs, 2005). Lack of implementation 
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capacity, corruption, and under-prioritization are important culprits in accounting for the 
relatively powerless visible hand in the BOP context (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 
2007). The prevalence of the informal sector further erodes government‟s power (De Soto, 
2000). The consequences of failing government intervention can be readily observed, 
especially in newly industrialized countries. The poor air quality in many Chinese cities 
dramatically exemplifies government failure in the environmental arena (World Bank, 2007). 
As the factors thwarting effective public policy in BOP markets are likely to persist in the 
short to medium term, local or national government intervention is no safeguard for 
environmentally sustainable development. 
In the international or supranational arena, the situation is somewhat different. Foreign 
governments of wealthy nation states may provide their less affluent counterparts with the 
financial and technical resources to implement policies to solve boundary-crossing 
environmental problems. The transfer of funds and know-how to developing countries in 
order to mitigate climate change, occurring within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol, is an 
example of potentially fruitful international collaboration (Wijen and Ansari, 2007). A related 
option is conditional financing by supranational bodies, in particular the „Washington 
consensus‟ (i.e., the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund). These bodies may 
make the availability of loans and donations contingent on the environmental performance of 
the projects for which the financed projects have been earmarked. Reality teaches us, though, 
that the environmental performance of projects financed by the highly politicized Washington 
consensus has so far not been convincing (Stiglitz, 2006; Von Moltke, 2005).  
International and supranational collaboration thus offers the potential for more effective 
government intervention in BOP markets, although this potential will only be realized if and 
when affluent foreign actors actually wield their economic and technical power to steer local 
and national BOP governments. 
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Self-regulation. If (local or national) governments fall short in effectively designing and 
implementing environmental regulation in BOP markets, companies may decide to 
collectively take the lead themselves and voluntarily assume sector-wide environmental 
measures. Indeed, self-regulation in Europe and North-America has become a common 
phenomenon that offers the potential of a significant reduction of an industry‟s environmental 
load, while granting companies the flexibility to take the measures that best fit with their 
idiosyncratic conditions (Delmas and Terlaak, 2001; Terlaak, 2007). The environmental 
effectiveness of environmental agreements has, though, been questioned since companies 
engage in self-regulation to pre-empt government regulation and confine their actions to 
highly visible „greenwashing‟ initiatives to „keep the watchdogs quiet‟ (Howard, Nash, and 
Ehrenfeld, 2000). Furthermore, self-regulation without sanctions leads to opportunistic 
behaviour and thus lacks effectiveness (King and Lenox, 2000; Lenox and Nash, 2003). Since 
the stick of government regulation is not a credible threat in the BOP context, it is thus 
unlikely that self-regulation will induce BOP firms to behave in an environmentally benign 
way. 
 
Civic action. Civic action is another non-market governance option. Citizens concerned 
about environmental degradation may organize themselves and pressurize producers and 
consumers to engage in environmentally more benign behaviour. Indeed, the history of social 
movements shows that the determination of concerned citizens has brought about important 
social and environmental improvements (Lounsbury, 2002; Rao, Morrill, and Zald, 2000). At 
the same time, it should be acknowledged that collective action is hard to organize. 
Individuals may want to free-ride on the contributions of other citizens (Olson, 1965), wait for 
others to take the lead (Marwell and Oliver, 1993), and consider their own contribution 
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materially insignificant (Fireman and Gamson, 1979). A collective-action problem germane to 
the BOP context is that the struggle for survival induces many actors to prioritize 
environmental protection less highly than actions that serve their direct material needs. The 
threat of collective inertia can, though, be overcome when stakes are high and interests are 
interrelated (Gray, 1999). Environmental problems that are perceived to severely harm the 
health of local citizens – in particular, observable and annoying pollution – are the most likely 
candidates for collective action. For example, a major reason of why the Ogoni community in 
Nigeria revolted against Shell was the perceived pollution of the Niger delta during oil 
extraction – a collective action that induced Shell to temporarily cease its Nigerian activities 
(Economist, 2000). 
Next to local collective action, international or supranational civic initiatives may seek 
to influence the environmentally relevant behaviour of BOP actors. The number and influence 
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Western countries aiming at worldwide 
environmental protection have rapidly risen over the past decades (Edwards, 2004; Van 
Tulder and Van der Zwart, 2006). These NGOs, such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, 
expose the perceived environmental abuses of companies around the world, including those in 
BOP markets. Many companies, especially Western multinational enterprises selling branded 
consumer products, have been sensitive to NGO actions and have increasingly eschewed 
activities that have a visibly adverse effect on the environment (Spar and La Mure, 2003). 
International and supranational NGOs may thus significantly contribute to environmentally 
more sustainable business practices in BOP markets, although many actors – especially small, 
„business-to-business‟, and non-Western companies – will largely remain outside the scope of 
such NGOs because their business activities will not be harmed by negative publicity or other 
civic actions. 
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The prospects for effective civic governance in the environmental BOP arena thus leave 
a moderate to fair potential for collective action, especially by international or supranational 
NGOs in specific sectors. To recap, the viability of local or national non-market instruments 
(especially governmental regulation and industry self-regulation) is low, while international or 
supranational non-market options (government regulation and civic action) are relatively 
feasible. Having identified the different pieces of the environmental governance puzzle, I will 
draw the „bigger picture‟ in the final section. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The objective of this essay was to analyze the environmental governability of BOP-
driven economic development. I focused on two major environmental dimensions (natural 
resource use and pollution) and argued that BOP-driven development will bring about 
important environmental challenges. I then analyzed the extent to which market mechanisms 
(market clearing, corporate innovation, and CSR) and a variety of other governance options 
(government regulation, industry self-regulation, and civic action) can be expected to function 
as effective safeguards for environmental sustainability.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Table 1 summarizes the main outcomes of this study. It shows that massive BOP-driven 
development would engender a differentiated environmental impact. While the natural 
environment would deteriorate in an absolute sense (in terms of increased natural-resource 
extraction and higher pollution levels), not all environmental effects are necessarily 
unsustainable – in the sense that widespread economic development based on the BOP 
philosophy cannot be sustained by the Earth‟s carrying capacity. Highly demanded resources 
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will be substituted by more readily available alternatives and be used more parsimoniously 
through product and process innovations. A notable exception are common pool resources, for 
which few governance mechanisms can effectively halt the inherent tendency towards 
overexploitation. Pollution is another environmental problem that is hard to address in the 
BOP context, both because of market disincentives and the modest feasibility of other 
governance options.  
The overall environmental impact will depend on the actual magnitude of the numerous, 
interrelated factors that determine BOP-driven development, including the number of BOP 
actors involved, the level of productive and consumptive activities these actors will develop, 
the average size of BOP companies, the extent of geographic concentration (especially of 
highly polluting activities), the frequency and length of transport movements, the nature of 
consumer preferences in BOP countries and export markets, the choice of (innovative) 
production technologies, the profitability of CSR activities, the power of NGOs and other 
civic watchdogs, and the influence of international and supranational authorities. The question 
of whether the BOP philosophy is compatible with environmental sustainability thus cannot 
be firmly answered upfront, since it is contingent on the empirical magnitudes of the above 
factors. Based on the above conceptual analysis of the key factors and their interrelations, I 
conclude that international collective action (supranational regulation, international civic 
action) is probably the most feasible governance mode to address the many negative 
environmental effects that are not absorbed by market forces, although these effects are 
particularly hard to address in the BOP context. A prerequisite for effective international 
collective action is that prosperous and well-organized members of the world community not 
only take the lead to addressing environmental problems in BOP countries but also show a 
firm commitment to actual solutions by providing significant financial, technical, and 
managerial resources. Linking environmental issues to socio-economic needs and mobilizing 
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bandwagons to enroll large numbers of participants are important collective-action 
mechanisms for furthering the environmental agenda (Wijen and Ansari, 2007). One example 
is providing supranationally (United Nations) coordinated subsidies and know-how to BOP 
production facilities in return for emitting low levels of greenhouse gases. Another example is 
international NGOs pressurizing Western retail chains to join the ranks of those competitors 
that market only sustainably logged tropical timber. 
The choices of whether the negative environmental consequences of BOP-driven 
economic development are acceptable should be made by those who bear these consequences, 
who are primarily but certainly not exclusively actors in BOP markets. My objective was not 
to assess, whether the BOP philosophy is good or bad from an environmental viewpoint, but 
rather to provide conceptual insights that will facilitate informed decisions. The analysis of 
the different elements and their interrelations will need to be further elaborated and 
quantified. Future analyses may also incorporate other environmental effects, such as 
biodiversity and space use. The essay‟s thrust was to provide a balanced view, striking a 
middle ground between deterministic pessimism (Meadows et al., 1972, 2005; United Nations 
Environment Programme, 2007) and unbridled optimism (Prahalad, 2005; Hart, 2005) as to 
the possibilities of economic growth in a finite natural environment.  
The environmental impact of the BOP philosophy has so far not only remained under-
researched (Kandachar and Halme, 2007) but has also been insufficiently subject to a critical 
analysis of the underlying causal mechanisms. The BOP research field will only mature if 
both its bright and dark sides are fully disclosed (Walsh, Kress, and Beyerchen, 2005). By 
deconstructing the multifaceted environmental landscape, I have tried to contribute to the 
further development of the largely unexplored BOP field, whose promises and pitfalls are 
numerous. Capitalizing on its opportunities while containing its environmental threats will be 
a tremendous challenge. 
22 
 
References 
 
Argote, L. (1999), Organizational learning: Creating, retaining and transferring knowledge, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston. 
Aspen Institute (2007), A closer look at business education: Bottom of the pyramid, 
http://www.wbcsd.org/plugins/DocSearch/, June. 
Banerjee, A. and E. Duflo (2007), The economic lives of the poor, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 21, 1, 141-167. 
Center for Sustainable Global Enterprise (2007), http://www.johnson.cornell.edu/sge/, 
accessed on 5 October. 
Cole, M. and E. Neumayer (2005), Environmental policy and the environmental Kuznets 
curve: Can developing countries escape the detrimental consequences of economic 
growth?, in P. Dauvergne (ed.), Handbook of global environmental politics, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Coleman, J. (1988), Social capital in the creation of human capital, American Journal of 
Sociology, 94: S95-S120. 
Daly, H. (1990), Toward some operational principle of sustainable development, Ecological 
Economics, 2, 1-6. 
Dauvergne, P. (2005, ed.), Handbook of global environmental politics, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham. 
Delmas, M. and A. Terlaak (2001), A framework for analyzing environmental voluntary 
agreements, California Management Review, 43, 3, 44-63. 
De Soto, H. (2000), The mystery of capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails 
everywhere else, Basic Books, New York. 
Drèze, J. and A. Sen (2001), Hunger and public action, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Economist, The (2000), Oil alone doesn‟t make you happy, 13 January. 
Economist, The (2004), C.K. Prahalad, profits and poverty, 19 August. 
Economist, The (2007), Energy for China, 12 July. 
Economist, The (2008), Peak nationalism, 3 January. 
Edwards, M. (2004), Civil society, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Ekins, P. (1997), The Kuznets curve for the environment and economic growth: Examining 
the evidence, Environment and Planning, Part A, 29, 5, 805-830. 
Esty, D. and A. Winston (2006), Green to gold: How smart companies use environmental 
strategy to innovate, create value, and build competitive advantage, Yale University 
Press, New Haven. 
Fagerberg, J. (2005), Innovation: A guide to the literature, in J. Fagerberg, D. Mowery, and R. 
Nelson (eds), The Oxford handbook of innovation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1-
26. 
Fireman, B. and W. Gamson (1979), Utilitarian logic in the resource mobilization perspective, 
in M. Zald and J. McCarthy (eds), The dynamics of social movements: Resource 
mobilization, social control, and tactics, Winthrop, Cambridge. 
Gray, B. (1999), The development of global environmental regimes: Organizing in the 
absence of authority, in D. Cooperrider and J. Dutton (eds), Organizational dimensions 
of global change: No limits to cooperation, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks. 
Grossman, G. and A. Krueger (1995), Economic growth and the environment, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 110, 2, 353-377. 
Hart, S. (2005), Capitalism at the crossroads: The unlimited business opportunities in solving 
the world’s most difficult problems, Wharton School Publishing/ Pearson Education, 
Upper Saddle River. 
23 
 
Hart, S. and C. Christensen (2002), The great leap: Driving innovation from the base of the 
pyramid, MIT Sloan Management Review, 44, 1, 51-56. 
Holliday, C., S. Schmidheiny, and P. Watts (2002), Walking the talk: The business case for 
sustainable development, Greenleaf, Sheffield. 
Howard, J., J. Nash, and J. Ehrenfeld (2000), Standard or smokescreen? Implementation of a 
voluntary environmental code, California Management Review, 42, 2, 63-82. 
Jordan, A., R. Wurzel, and A. Zito (2005), Environmental governance… or government? The 
international politics of environmental instruments, in P. Dauvergne (ed.), Handbook of 
global environmental politics, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Kandachar, P. and M. Halme (2007), Introduction, Greener Management International, 51, 
June, 3-17. 
Karnani, A. (2007a), The mirage of marketing to the bottom of the pyramid: How the private 
sector can help alleviate poverty, California Management Review, 49, 4, 90-111. 
Karnani, A. (2007b), Doing well by doing good; Case study: „Fair & Lovely‟ whitening 
cream, Strategic Management Journal, 28, 13, 1351-1357. 
Katz, M. and C. Shapiro (1985), Network externalities, competition, and compatibility, 
American Economic Review, 75, June, 424-440. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2007), Governance matters IV: Worldwide 
governance indicators, 1996-2006, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/, 
World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
King, A. and M. Lenox (2000), Industry self-regulation without sanctions: The chemical 
industry‟s responsible care program, Academy of Management Journal, 43, 698-716. 
Kölliker, A. (2005), Globalisation and national incentives for protecting environmental goods: 
Types of goods, trade effects, and international collective action problems, in F. Wijen, 
K. Zoeteman, and J. Pieters (eds), A handbook of globalisation and environmental 
policy: National government interventions in a global arena, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham. 
Landrum, N. (2007), Advancing the “base of the pyramid” debate, Strategic Management 
Review, 1, 1, 1-12. 
Liebowitz, S. and S. Margolis (1994), Network externality: An uncommon tragedy, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 8, 2, 133-150. 
Lenox, M. and J. Nash (2003), Industry self-regulation and adverse selection: A comparison 
across four trade association programs, Business Strategy and the Environment, 12, 343-
356. 
London, T. and S. Hart (2004), Reinventing strategies for emerging markets: Beyond the 
transnational model, Journal of International Business Studies, 35, 5, 350-370. 
Lounsbury, M. (2002), Institutional transformation and status mobility: The 
professionalization of the field of finance, Academy of Management Journal, 45, 1, 255-
266. 
Margolis, J. and J. Walsh (2003), Misery loves company: Rethinking social initiatives by 
business, Administrative Science Quarterly, 48, 268-305. 
Marwell, G. and P. Oliver (1993), The critical mass in collective action: A micro-social 
theory, Cambridge University Press, New York. 
Meadows, D., D. Meadows, J. Randers, and W. Behrens (1972), The limits to growth: A 
report for the Club of Rome’s project on the predicament of mankind, Earth Island, 
London. 
Meadows, D., J. Randers, and D. Meadows (2005), Limits to growth: The 30-year update, 
Chelsea Green Publishing, White River Junction. 
Moran, M., M. Rein, and R. Goodin, eds (2006, The Oxford handbook of public policy, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
24 
 
Olson, M. (1965), The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
Opschoor, H. (2005), Globalisation and policies/politics towards sustainable development in 
developing countries, in F. Wijen, K. Zoeteman, and J. Pieters (eds), A handbook of 
globalisation and environmental policy: National government interventions in a global 
arena, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Peters, G. and J. Pierre, eds (2006), Handbook of public policy, Sage, Thousand Oaks. 
Prahalad, C.K. (2005), The fortune at the bottom of the pyramid: Eradicating poverty through 
profits, Wharton School Publishing/ Pearson Education, Upper Saddle River. 
Prahalad, C.K. and A. Hammond (2002), Serving the world‟s poor, profitably, Harvard 
Business Review, September, 48-57. 
Rao, H., C. Morrill, and M. Zald (2000), Power plays: How social movements and collective 
action create new organizational forms, in B. Staw and R. Sutton (eds), Research in 
organizational behavior, 22, 237-281, JAI Press/Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Reich, R. (2007), Supercapitalism: The transformation of business, democracy, and everday 
life, Knopf, New York. 
Rocha, H. (2004), Entrepreneurship and development: The role of clusters, Small Business 
Economics, 23, 5, 363-400. 
Sachs, J. (2005), The end of poverty: Economic possibilities for our time, Penguin Press, New 
York. 
Schumacher, E. (1973), Small is beautiful: Economics as if people mattered, Harper and Row, 
New York. 
Spar, D. and L. La Mure (2003), The power of activism: Assessing the impact of NGOs on 
global business, California Management Review, 45, 3, 78-101. 
Stern, D., M. Common, and E. Barbier (1996), Economic growth and environmental 
degradation: The environmental Kuznets curve and sustainable development, World 
Development, 24, 7, 1151-1160. 
Stiglitz, J. (2006), Making globalization work, Norton, New York. 
Suri, V. and D. Chapman (1998), Economic growth, trade and energy: Implications for the 
environmental Kuznets curve, Ecological Economics, 25, 2, 195-208. 
Terlaak, A. (2007), Order without law? The role of certified management standards in shaping 
socially desired firm behaviors, Academy of Management Review, 32, 3, 968-985. 
Tietenberg, T. (1988), Environmental and natural resource economics, 2
nd
 edn., Scott, 
Foresman and Company, Glenview. 
United Nations (2005), Press release, 24 February,  http://www.un.org/ News/Press/docs/ 
2005/pop918.doc.htm. 
United Nations Development Programme (1998), Human development report 1998: 
Consumption for human development, http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1998/. 
United Nations Environment Programme (2007), Global Environment Outlook 4, United 
Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi. 
Van Tulder, R. and A. van der Zwart (2006), International business-society management: 
Linking corporate responsibility and globalization, Routledge, London. 
Vogel, D. (2005), The market for virtue: The potential and limits of corporate social 
responsibility, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C. 
Von Moltke, K. (2005), Globalisation and environmental policy design, in F. Wijen, K. 
Zoeteman, and J. Pieters (eds), A handbook of globalisation and environmental policy: 
National government interventions in a global arena, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Von Weizsäcker, E, A. Lovins, and H. Lovins (1997), Factor four: Doubling wealth, halving 
resource use: The new report to the Club of Rome, Earthscan, London. 
25 
 
Walsh, J., J. Kress, and K. Beyerchen (2005), Book review essay: Promises and perils at the 
Bottom of the Pyramid, Administrative Science Quarterly, September, 473-482. 
Wijen, F. and S. Ansari (2007), Overcoming inaction through collective institutional 
entrepreneurship: Insights from regime theory, Organization Studies, 28, 7, 1079-1100. 
Wijen, F., K. Zoeteman, and J. Pieters (2005, eds), A handbook of globalisation and 
environmental policy: National government interventions in a global arena, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Winsemius, P. and U. Guntram (2002), A thousand shades of green: Sustainable strategies 
for competitive advantage, Earthscan, London. 
World Bank (2007), Cost of pollution in China: Economic estimates of physical damages, 
World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (2007), New business-NGO 
partnerships help the world‟s poorest, http://www.wbcsd.org/plugins/DocSearch/, 26 
September. 
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), Our common future, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Yunus, M. (2007), Creating a world without poverty: Social business and the future of 
capitalism, Public Affairs, New York. 
 
 
 
26 
 
Table 1: Summary of Environmental Impact of BOP-Driven Economic Development 
 
 
Economic 
factor 
Environmental 
effect 
Potential remedy Feasibility of 
remedy                
Sustainability 
outcome 
Increased 
demand for 
private natural 
resources 
Depletion of 
private natural 
resources 
Market clearing 
Corporate 
innovation 
High 
High 
Decreased but 
not depleted 
stock of 
private natural 
resources 
Increased 
demand for 
common pool 
natural 
resources 
Depletion of 
common pool 
natural 
resources 
Corporate 
innovation 
CSR 
 
Civic action 
Low 
 
Low (except for 
niche markets) 
Low (except for 
globally relevant 
resources) 
Depletion of 
common pool 
resources 
(except for 
niche markets 
and „global‟ 
resources) 
Increased 
production 
Increased 
consumption 
Pollution Local/ national 
regulation  
Supranational 
regulation 
 
 
Self-regulation 
CSR 
 
Local civic action  
 
 
International civic 
action  
 
Low 
 
Contingent 
(higher for visible 
trans-boundary 
issues) 
Low 
Low (except for 
niche markets) 
Low (except for 
directly harmful 
issues) 
Fair (for visible 
globally relevant  
issues) 
Moderate to 
high pollution 
(higher for less 
visible, 
indirect, inter-
temporal 
effects) 
 
Small size Increases 
pollution and 
Ally with large 
(multinational) 
Moderate Increase of 
pollution 
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use of natural 
resources 
(diseconomies) 
Decreases use 
of natural 
resources 
(sharing of 
economic 
resources) 
organizations or 
with other small 
(local) actors 
Increase or 
decrease of 
natural-
resource use 
(contingent on 
relative 
importance of 
opposing 
forces) 
Decentralization Decreases 
pollution (less 
transport) 
Multiplication 
of polluted 
production 
sites 
 
 
 
Local/ national 
regulation 
 
 
 
Low 
Reduction of 
transport-
related 
pollution 
Dissemination 
of production-
related 
pollution 
 
